The Sabah state government continues to maintain an unyielding position regarding its immigration powers, making clear that the newly enacted Malaysia Border Control and Protection Agency Act 2024 cannot be permitted to diminish the autonomous rights the state secured at the formation of Malaysia. Speaking in the State Legislative Assembly in Kota Kinabalu on July 22, the government articulated its constitutional concerns and reaffirmed commitments made to federal leadership about protecting Sabah's unique status within the federation.
According to Datuk Joniston Bangkuai, the Assistant Minister to the Chief Minister, the state has formally communicated its position through official correspondence to Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim. The core of Sabah's argument rests on the principle that while the federal government holds constitutional authority over the Act itself, this does not grant it the power to override the state's explicitly protected immigration autonomy. This distinction between federal legislative jurisdiction and state operational control represents a critical constitutional boundary that Sabah intends to preserve.
Central to the state government's position is the insistence that the Sabah State Immigration Department must remain the primary authority overseeing all entry and exit points within the state's borders. This institutional arrangement carries practical significance beyond administrative preference, as it ensures that immigration decisions affecting Sabah continue to reflect local knowledge, priorities and governance structures. The state has equally emphasised that the authority to issue Not-To-Land notices, which can prevent individuals from entering the state, must rest exclusively with the state immigration apparatus rather than being transferred to or shared with federal agencies.
The foundation for Sabah's stance lies in Article V of the Malaysia Agreement 1963, the constitutional document that established the terms upon which Sabah joined the Malaysian federation. This article specifically grants immigration powers to Sabah, distinguishing it from other Malaysian states and reflecting the state's historical position as a semi-autonomous entity with distinct governance arrangements. Joniston underscored that these rights are not discretionary privileges that can be negotiated away but rather constitutional safeguards that form part of the bedrock of Malaysia's federal structure.
The postponement of Act 860's implementation in Sabah, which Chief Minister Datuk Seri Hajiji Noor announced in May, reflects the seriousness with which the state government views this matter. Rather than hastily adopting the federal legislation, Sabah has deliberately held implementation in abeyance pending explicit assurances from the federal government that the state's special status would remain inviolate. This tactical delay signals that Sabah will not treat immigration autonomy as negotiable even under pressure to align with federal timelines or preferences.
Hajiji's previous statements have emphasised that Sabah and Sarawak view their immigration autonomy as fundamentally inseparable from Malaysia's founding compact. Both states regard the preservation of immigration control as essential to their continued participation in the federation, underscoring that these powers were not granted as conveniences but as defining characteristics of their membership in Malaysia. The Chief Minister made explicit that immigration autonomy for Sabah and Sarawak was so essential to the formation of Malaysia that its absence would have rendered union unlikely.
For Malaysian observers, this dispute raises significant questions about federalism and constitutional protection in an increasingly centralised state system. Sabah's resistance reflects broader tensions between federal efficiency and state rights, between nation-building imperatives and protection of minority jurisdictions. The confrontation also demonstrates how constitutional agreements made at the federation's inception can become friction points decades later, particularly when federal agencies seek to expand operational reach or coordinate functions across previously autonomous domains.
The constitutional implications extend beyond Sabah itself. Sarawak faces parallel concerns regarding its own immigration autonomy under the same MA63 framework, meaning that any federal encroachment on Sabah's rights would potentially establish precedent affecting Sarawak's protections. Regional observers in Southeast Asia may also note this as an instance of how founding constitutional compromises remain contested terrain even as federations mature.
From a practical governance standpoint, the Act's enforcement raises operational questions about coordination between the new Malaysia Border Control and Protection Agency and existing state immigration machinery. The federal agency's mandate to protect Malaysia's borders necessarily involves all entry points, including those in Sabah and Sarawak, creating inherent jurisdictional overlap that pure constitutional reasoning alone cannot easily resolve. Whether the federal agency can achieve its protective mandate without direct operational control in Sabah remains an unresolved challenge.
The state government has framed this not merely as a technical disagreement about administrative arrangements but as a matter touching the constitutional integrity of the federation itself. In Joniston's statements, there is clear suggestion that erosion of Sabah's immigration powers would represent a broader failure to respect constitutional guarantees that protect the state's position within Malaysia. This rhetorical elevation underscores how deeply the Sabah government views this matter and hints at potential escalation if federal authorities attempt to proceed without securing state agreement.
For citizens and businesses operating in Sabah, the standoff creates uncertainty about which agency ultimately controls immigration decisions. Until resolution occurs, there remains ambiguity about whether federal or state immigration authority holds final say in contested cases, a situation that could create friction for legitimate travellers and investors unfamiliar with the constitutional questions underlying the dispute.
Moving forward, resolution will likely require negotiation between Sabah's political leadership and the federal government to establish protocols that satisfy federal border protection objectives while honouring state autonomy. The precise mechanisms—whether through formal amendment of the Act, executive agreements, or operational arrangements—remain to be determined. That Sabah has framed this as non-negotiable, however, suggests that federal authorities will find the state an unyielding negotiating partner on this particular constitutional boundary.
